Lexicon of Arguments

Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
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Theses I
Theses II

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Bubner I 142
Reason/Kant/Bubner: no one but the reason can say what reason really is - reason is bothered by the questions it cannot reject, nor answer.
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Kant I 105
Reason/unit/Kant: the law of reason to seek unity is necessary because we would not have any reason without it and therefore no sufficient feature of empirical truth. - Thus we have not only punctual correspondence, but systematic coherence.
Kant assumed reason in nature.
>Nature/Kant.
I 113
Reason/Kant: reason in itself, is not something objective, even ideas of purposes are not. - We project reasonable causes into the object. - However: this projection is necessary, but it is only a projection that justifies no real science.
Reason:
Def Pure Reason/Kant: pure reason unifies ideas in an intuition by categories.
Def Pure logic: unifies different ideas in a judgment.
>Judgments/Kant.
I 87
Def Reason/Kant: the capability of concepts. Also the pure reason can be a source of knowledge, for "philosophical" knowledge, and formal-logical. Term/Kant: "nothing but the synthesis is possible intuitions that are not given a priori ". Philosophical propositions are therefore always general principles for possible empirical intuition connections, for example, the principle of causality.
>Concepts/Kant, >Categories/Kant.
I 93
"Inside" acts of reason/Kant: "inner sense, of which time is the shape". - The images, which prescribe the objective units of things, are images of I of itself in time. - The unity of consciousness of the object is then also the unity of the thing. -> Schematism: recognizes categories as useful as illustrative determinations.
I 99
Reason/Kant: term - Power of judgment: judgment - Reason: End.
All three are forming the reason in a broader sense.
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Münch III 327
Def Reason/Kant: the capability of rules. They are separated from intuition for Kant. Holenstein: modern: intelligence.

Elmar Holenstein, Mentale Gebilde, in: Dieter Münch (Hg) Kognitionswissenschaft, Frankfurt 1992
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Strawson V 24
Reason/Kant: general functions also without sensuality - pure reason terms: = categories.
>Categories/Kant.
V 25
Schematism: transition to categories-in-use. - Only time without space.
Transcendental deduction: each category must have a use in experience.
StrawsonVsKant: that is logically flawed.
>Experience/Kant, >Time/Kant.
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Bubner I 103
Kant/new: mind action consists in judging, a table of pure mind functions, which, however, are indeterminate with respect to all objects.
The performance of union results from the act. It is not triggered from the outside! > Synthesis/Kant.
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Adorno XIII 105
Mind/Kant/Adorno: as far as reason is concerned, which refers to the possibility of recognizing the content, the material, Kant speaks of reason.
Mind activity/Kant: is the activity of reason, which refers to a material which belongs to the senses ir azus and which unifies them and deals with its synthesis.
Reason/Kant: here, this activity should be no longer bound to such a material but should be free of it. In the cognitive or noological meaning, reason gives us at least the regulative, in the sense of which our experience of the sensual is to proceed. Reason in this concise sense would be the ability to recognize ideas.
Reason/Kant/Adorno: in a third sense, reason gives in perfect freedom its objects to itself. This is the practical use of reason. Paradoxically, we are here, according to Kant...
Adorno XIII 106
...not bound to the topic.
Practical reason/Kant/Adorno: our reason or we act practically, insofar as we act purely according to reason and according to its purposes, without letting these purposes be given to us.
Purpose/Kant/Adorno: Thus, we must only allow them to be given to ourselves by our own principle, the innermost principle of subjectivity itself.
>Subjectivity/Kant.
Reason/Kant/Adorno: is then an absolute activity of the mind in contrast to one limited by materials. In this way it becomes a higher and, to a certain extent, a counter-instance of the reason.
Adorno XIII 110
Mind/Kant/Adorno: the reason activity which refers to the order functions which we are exercising against a material which comes to us from the outside and which is chaotic, unstructured and in itself quite undetermined according to Kant.
Reason/Kant: once again reflects on the mind, on the use which the mind makes of itself and judges according to it, decides whether, in the sense of the purposes which it
Adorno XIII 111
gives to itself, is a more highly developed one.
Adorno XIII 112
Reason/Hegel/Adorno: in Hegel and already in Kant, there are reminiscences of the reification of reason in the sense that the common human should not think too much.
Adorno XIII 113
Reason/Horkheimer/Adorno: Problem: reason should be the principle of freedom, but at the same time also a law and in this respect something badly repressive. In its concept, however, the relation of freedom and coercion has not actually been articulated.

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