Lexicon of Arguments

 

I (c) 87
Interpretation/Putnam: interpretation is not a representation, but production.
>Logical constants.
E.g. classical connectives are not represented using the intuitionistic connectives, but the classical theorems are produced.
>Intuitionism.
Putnam: the meaning of the connectives is still not classic, because these meanings are explained by means of provability and not by truth. Change of meaning: e.g. assuming we wanted to formulate Newton's laws in intuitionistic mathematics, then we would have to limit the real numbers (for example, on the 30th decimal).
I (c) 88
Then, in the classical theory, the connectives would refer to "provability in B1" and in the other to "provability in B2". Then the connectives would change their meaning when knowledge changes.
I (c) 95
Realism/Putnam: the realistic conception of connectives ensures that a statement is not solely true because it follows a (any) theory.
I (c) 96
Ideal Assertibility/PutnamVsPeirce: no "ideal limit" can be specified reasonably. It is not used to specify any conditions for science.
>>Peirce.
PutnamVsKuhn: if you do not believe in convergence but in revolutions, you should interpret the connectives intuitionistically and apprehend truth intra-theoretically.
>Kuhn.
I (c) 97
Truth/logic/Putnam: the meaning of "true" and the connectives are not determined by their formal logic -> Holism/Quine: the distinction between the entire theory and individual statement meanings is useless.