I (b) 35/6
See here: Proposition: This "relativism" contains nothing that could show that the measured properties are not "real".
I (b) 36
Strangely, however, these conclusions have been drawn by some: e.g. John Searle: it would be incomprehensible that two different interpretations could each serve to correctly interpret the same thoughts or utterances of one person.
I (b) 36
Just as numbers can capture all empirically significant relationships between weights or temperatures in an infinite number of different ways, a person's utterance can capture all the significant characteristics of the thoughts of another person in different ways.
Jerry Fodor also argues that the holism or the indeterminacy of translation is a threat to realism regarding the propositinal attitudes. >
Holism.
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Glüer II 49
DavidsonVsFodor: the same mistake: indeterminacy of the translation does not mean that the thoughts themselves are somehow vague or unreal.
The indeterminacy of the translation also applies when all data are available. (Quine). There is in principle more than one translation manual. >
Translation manual.
Indeterminacy of Interpretation/Davidson: There are no empirical criteria to decide between empirically equivalent theories.
Davidson: Solution: we must cease to regard an utterance as belonging to a particular language and no other. Rather, we should identify languages with truth theories. The indeterminacy loses its scariness.
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Davidson I 57
Relativity/Davidson: is not an indeterminateness at all.
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Glüer II 46
Translating Indeterminacy/Quine/Davidson/Glüer: also exists when all data are available - there is in principle more than one translation manual.
Glüer II 47
Indeterminacy of interpretation/Davidson: there are no empirical criteria to decide between empirically equivalent theories.
Glüer II 47
Indeterminacy/Davidson/Glüer: there are 3 types:
1. The logical form: empirically equivalent theories (e.eq.th.) can identify predicates, singular terms etc. differently.
2. The reference: empirically equivalent theories can be assigned to different referents.
3. The truth: the same sentence can have different truth values for empirically equivalent theories.
Glüer II 49
Problem: how can both sentences be appropriate?
Solution: we must not regard an utterance as belonging to only one language.
Instead: identify languages with truth theories.
