Lexicon of Arguments

 Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
[german]


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Theses I
Theses II

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I 54
Belief/objective/Lewis/Stalnaker: according to Lewis all objective impersonal beliefs are beliefs about what exists in reality, and not about the place of the believer in the world. They are either necessarily true or necessarily false. But beliefs do not express anything.
- - -
Schiffer I 46
Belief/Stalnaker/Schiffer: a belief with content can have the form: "x believes that dogs have fleas". A belif without content can have the form: "x is a belief".
Stalnaker/Stampe: counterfactual: x believes p iff. x is in a brain state, that x would not be under optimal conditions, if it were not the case that p.
>Counterfactuals, >Counterfactual conditionals.
Representation/Dretske: example fuel gauge: is a reliable indicator (> reliability) by regularity for the representation.
SchifferVs: problem: if the condition is never met.
Conclusion: if propositions are belief objects, then the theory is never functionalist.
>Functionalism.

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