I 273
Def subdoxastic/Stich: (1978): a subdoxastic state is not a religious state, but an information-bearing state. You are unconscious and inferentially insulated from beliefs.
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Unconsious, >
Belief state, >
Beliefs, >
Inference.
E.g. if there is a transformational grammar, then the states they would represent would be subdoxastic.
Schiffer thesis: language processing is done through a series of internal subdoxastic states.
1. Stephen P. Stich (1978). Beliefs and subdoxastic states. In: Philosophy of Science 45 (December):499-518
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I 26
Belief/Schiffer: problem: such a psychological theory does not create the meaning of beliefs. - Solution: functionalist reduction.
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Psycho functionalism.
Ultimately: "Bel = def 1st element of an ordered pair of functions that satisfies T (f,g) "...
((s) from which the theory says that it is belief) ...) - ((s) "Loar-style").
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Meaning theory/Loar.
I 28
Schiffer: It is already presupposed that one forms beliefs and desires as functions of propositions on (sets of) internal Z-types.
>Functional role/Schiffer.
The criterion that a Z-token is n a belief, that p is, that n is a token of a Z-type which has the functional role, that correlates the definition of bel T with p.
I 150
Belief property/SchifferVs: if belief properties existed, they would not be irreducible (absurd). - ((s) It is already proven for Schiffer that there is a neural proposition for E.g. stepping back from a car.)
This is the cause - then we have a mental proposition in addition.
This is then not supported by any counterfactual conditional.
Counterfactual conditional/(s): indicates whether something is superfluous - or whether it is then sufficient as an explanation.
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Counterfactual conditionals.
I 155
Belief properties/Schiffer: presumed they existed (language-independent), then they should be simple (non-assembled), i.e. no function of other things.
Vs: E.g. the proposition, to love Thatcher is composed of love and Thatcher - but belief is no such relation (see above).
Problem: if belief properties are semantically simple, then there is an infinite number of them. - Then language learning is impossible.
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Language acquisition, >
Learning.
I 163
Belief predicates: less problematic than belief properties: irreducibility out of conceptual role.
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Conceptual role.
E.g. Ava would not have stepped back if she did not have the belief property that a car is coming.
Conceptually and ontologically independent of the singular term "The EC of the belief that a car comes"
This is a benign predicate-dualism (in terms of conceptual roles). It has no causal power.
Pleonastic: Ava stepped back because she had the belief property...
I 164
Belief/(s): Where, Ava believes that a car is coming, she believes this in every possible world that is physically indistinguishable from the actual world.
Problem: that cannot be proven - but is probably true.
Then ultimately, she stepped back, because she was in the neural state...
SchifferVsEliminativism/SchifferVsChurchland: the eliminativism should then have the result that nobody believes anything.
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Eliminativism, >
Reductionism.
