Lexicon of Arguments

Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
[german]


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Theses I
Theses II

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Schiffer I 19
Belief/Loar: is understood as a function that depicts propositions on internal physical states. - These internal physical states have functional roles that are specified by these propositions.
I 286f
Belief/SchifferVsLoar: Problem: his realization of a theory of beliefs/desires - (as a function of propositions on physical states), whose functional roles are defined by the theory. - Problem: to find a theory that correlates each proposition with a single functional role rather than many roles. - Schiffer: this will not work, therefore the Quine-Field argument is done in.
Quine-Field Argument/Schiffer: (I 157) Belief/Beliefs/Quine/Schiffer: for Quine, beliefs are never true, although he concedes Quine pro Brentano: ~ you cannot break out of the intentional vocabulary. But:
QuineVsBrentano: ~ the canonical scheme includes no propositional attitudes, only physical constitution and behavior of organisms.

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