Lexicon of Arguments

 

I 52
Problem for all rationalist and realist theories: if we cannot say that logic is ultimately rooted in our practices, while this becomes evident in the fact that we find conclusions in conflicts, namely in judgements about which we agree naturally. We cannot say that logic depends on such practices, because that would in turn violate these practices in which logic has the last word.
>Logic, >Practise, >Justification, >Ultimate judstification.
I 53
But it is it not true that the relevance of our practices shows in that this last word is the last word in our thoughts and argumentations.
This is derived from Wittgenstein.
>Solipsism/Wittgenstein.
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Frank I 132f
Theory/Nagel: must be understandable without the ability to assume a particular position.

Thomas Nagel (1974): What Is It Like to Be a Bat?, in: The Philosophical
Review 83 (1974), 435-450