Bigelow I 180
Definition Lagadonian Language/Lagadonian/Terminology/Swift/Lewis/Bigelow/Pargetter: by this name Lewis calls such a language, following Gulliver's travels. (1986a(1), p. 145). It is a set theoretical structure on individuals, characteristics, and relations.
1. Lewis, David 1986a. Philosophical Papers, Volume II, Oxford: Oxford University Press
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Schwarz I 97
Properties/Lewis/Schwarz: Definition intrinsic property: never differ between perfect duplicates. Duplicate: Defined not by sum, but by distribution of the perfectly natural property.
Def Perfectly natural property: (PNP) = fundamental property: all qualitative intrinsic differences between things (also possible worlds) are based on their instantiation. - E.g. Fred is the tallest in his family, but his duplicate is not in his family. - that depends on distribution of intrinsic properties: if we duplicate the entire family, the duplicate is sure to be the tallest there as well.
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IV 58
Relation/individuation/Lewis: Relations are usually individuated through coextension. I-Relation/R-Relation/Lewis: These two relations are identical because they are coextensive.
Def R-Relation/Identity/Continuity/Person/Lewis: a certain relation and connection among person states.
Question: What conditions will survive the state in which you ask yourself this question?
For example, if you walk out of a duplicator, who will you be, who will come out of the right or left door, or both?
Def I-Relation/Lewis: Question: Which of the permanent persons are identical to the former?
But of course there are also I-relations between the individual states!
IV 259
Ramsey-sentence/Lewis: wipes out the difference between intensional and extensional language - at the same time it eliminates technical vocabulary by existential quantification.
"Ramsification" neutral level: there is a system of categories, S, N, X/Y, there are three relationships of expressions to things: A-tension, B-tension, C-tension.
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I (b) 27
Theoretical Terms/TT/Lewis: (T terms) are names, not predicates or functions.
I (b) 31
They can always be eliminabted by being replaced by their definientia.
I (b) 34
Here: the T terms are names of mental states, the A terms are names for stimuli and responses and also for causal relationships.
Theoretical terms: (T terms) are names, not predicates or functions.
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V 11
Compatibility/Possible world/Lewis: B is compatible with A in world i if an A world is closer to i than any non-B-world. - (Reversal of rather true) - then A were>>would C is true if C follows from A together with auxiliary hypotheses B1...Bn. - E.g. natural laws are compatible or completely incompatible with every assumption - thesis: then laws of nature are generalizations of what we consider to be particularly important. - Then conformity with Laws of Nature should be important for the similarity relation between possible worlds
V 86
Principal Principle/main principle/probability/opportunity/Lewis: the Principal Principle is to be modeled according to our experience with direct conclusions.
Exceptions: 1) it is about opportunity, not frequency.
2) Certainty of probabilities (opportunities) contributes to the resilience (resistance to new information).
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Schwarz I 99
Relations/Lewis: intrinsic: e.g., greater-relation (concerns only the two sides).
Extrinsic: e.g. grandmother-relation (needs a third).
Internal relation: (not equal to intrinsic relation): depends only on intrinsic properties and is reducible to them.
External relation: is also intrinsic, but just not reducible.
E.g., Spatiotemporal relation: "intrinsic with respect to pairs".
Identity/partial relation/elementarity/Lewis: These are all no relations!
