Chisholm II 153
Noema/Husserl: the act itself constitutes the object. We separate files and transcendental objects.
II 154
ChisholmVsHusserl: the noema explains nothing.
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Husserl I 19/57
Husserl: research strategy: scheme part-whole. General thesis: the existence of the world is not questioned, only our statements about it. The scheme true/false cannot be recognized by mere observation.
I 37
Real/Husserl: the real is not intentional, but also: the color quality experiences an "objectifying view" and the "perception complexion" is also real. Meaning/Husserl: meaning is constituted by what is meant by a sign, the speaker gives the sound a sense. We refer to an object by meaning. Meaning/Husserl: meaning is the power of consciousness. Phenomenological pre-understanding: all objects exist only as intentional units.
I 39
Noema(thought)/Husserl: noema has a a) a relational sense: as intension and b) a subject core as a carrier. Noesis: is performance or the nature of the conception sense (Greek: noesis = perception).
I 53
"Principle of all principles"/Husserl: "the principle of all principles" is the requirement that only one "originally given view" may be the reason of knowledge, e.g. mathematical axioms. Husserl excludes here any reference to empirical statements and creates the relation of consciousness to itself as a suitable method, a "way of givennes to oneself".
I 58
Bracketing (era): prior knowledge is enclosed in parentheses.
I 42 f
Def Noesis: is a performance or the nature of the conception sense (Greek: the perception, comprehension).
I 43
Def Noema: Greek: noema means the idea. There are two aspects of the intentional object: a) noematic meaning (content): it is the "how" of the determinations. And b) it is a coherent sense unit in the abundance of various provisions.
I 44
b) Noematic object (objectively) "core": is the linking point and support of various predicates. That, with what an identical "something" is being held.
I 65 ff
A horizon of possibilities is given by any act of consciousness.
I 67
Interior Horizon/Husserl: the interior horizon is the anticipation of the dimension of meaning. Outside horizon: means that perception is not limited to one object, but to the entire space of possible objects.
I 68
Appresentation: is co-meaning.
I 69
Apperception: rethinks contents of sensation into attributes of objectivity.
Truth/Husserl: truth is tied to the process of closer definition.
Eidetic variation/Husserl: the eidetic variation is activated by contingencies.
Constitution/Husserl: constitution is a performance of consciousness when an object is given to us to look at.
I 45
Thought/Husserl: if one understands thinking as a process, you can see that predicates can convert.
I 72
Def Kinesthesia/Husserl: kinesthesia is the conscious moving during perception i.e. >
body awareness. The body is turned into the organ of perception. The sensations can no longer be regarded as single, completed, last units, depending on the way of thinking. They are in a sequence.
I 85
Transcendental Ego/Husserl: the transcendental ego has a primordial sphere: initially there are only own things in the private sphere. We assume others to be a transcendental ego as we are. (>
Empathy).
Intersubjectivity/Husserl: intersubjective are a) objects, b) social.
Objectivity/Husserl: objectivity arises through a variety of perspectives.
Environment/Husserl: environment is a) set by the intentional consciousness and b) set by a communicating association of people. The communicative environment is previous to any selfish.
I 89
Def primordiality/Husserl: this includes all experiences of experience, including the introductory experiences of consciousness that are fundamental to the foreign experience. The consequence of this would be that experiences of consciousness can be experienced by the other in their original condition. Such a conception would encompass different modes of consciousness as original: both objective and personal.
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Tugendhat I 167
"Syncategorematic"/Husserl: sycategorematic expressions are not representing an object.
Tugendhat I 177
Husserl: main term "species": "species" comes from the Greek "eidos", which means "sight" or "appearance" (common feature in Kant, term).
