I 52
Two-Names-Theory/TNT/GeachVsAristoteles: false approximation of predication and naming: as if predicates were (complex) names: "on the mat") - ((s) E.g. "The person who stabbed Ceasar stabbed the one stabbed by Brutus").
Geach: besides, a binding element would be needed.
Two-name-theory: "Socrates is a philosopher" is supposed to be true, because the same thing is named.
Vs: "philosopher" (general term) is not a name for "all (or any) philosopher".
I 54
Two-Classes-Theory/TCT/GeachVs: even worse than the Two-Name-Theory: the general term "philosopher" means "class of philosophers" - Socrates is then only a part of the class. Vs: The element-relation is quite different from the subclass-relation: E.g. a parliamentary committee is not a member of Parliament.
But: "is a philosopher" means exactly the same in both applications. - copula: fallacy of division: as if there were two varieties of "is": one for "is a philosopher," and one for "is an element of the class of philosophers" - Geach: equivalent sentences need not be able to be divided into equivalent sub-sets - "every logician" is not equivalent to "class of logicians".
I 122
Latin prose theory/Geach: the relative pronoun is treated as a connection of a binding word with a bound pronoun: "the" is translated as "so that":
E.g. the king sent emissaries to make them ask for peace.
E.g.(Bach-Peters phrases) solution :
A boy kissed a girl, and she really loved him, but he was only pretending (this is still ambiguous). but
Solution: e.g. Every true Englishman reveres __ above all ... and __ is his queen.
I 239
Predicate/Terminology/Geach: I only name predicates like this if they are used as the principal functor in a proposition, otherwise "predicables".
I-predicables/I-predicate/Geach: (s): those predicates which are indistinguishable with respect to the two objects in a given theory.
If distinctions can be made in an extended theory, the I-predicate does not change its meaning, it is no longer an I-predicate.
E.g. "uniform" for (different, but not yet differentiated) tokens of words, later tokens are distinguished, but still "uniform".
I 245
"Surman"/Geach: (should be identical, if they have the same family name) are not counted twice because in different theories differently provided with predicates and thus counted differently. ((s) identified as different by the theory.)
E.g. applicable in the universe with the same right: "is the same token as ..", "is the same type as ... "- "is the same lexicon entry as...".
I 250
Ascription theory/Geach: Vs "acts of will": attribution of responsibility instead of causality (GeachVs) - Oxford: Thesis: to say that an action is willful is not a description of the action but an attribution.
I 291
GeachVsAristoteles: Vs "Two-Name-Theory"/TNT: confuses the relation of names to named with the relation of the predicate to from what it is said. -> false
Doctrine of the Trinity.
