III 44ff
Institutional facts/Searle: e.g. money, elections, universities, chess, etc. First, there must be something physical.
Fact/Searle: a fact is something outside the statement that makes it true, like a condition.
Fact/Austin/Strawson: a fact is what is said, not something that is testified about.
III 212
Fact/Searle: a fact is a general name for the conditions how sentences relate to ... something.
III 219
Strawson: facts are not complex things or groups of things. Fact and statement are not two independent entities and facts are not language independent. Facts are not what statements are "about".
Frege: a fact is a true statement (StrawsonVs, AustinVs). Strawson: they are not identical, because they play different roles: facts are causal statements, not statements.
III 214
Facts are "internal accusative" for true statements (spurious relation).
III 219
Fact/Searle: a fact can only be formulated but not named.
III 215
Searle: facts are not true statements. A fact has a causal relation - several statements are possible for a fact.
>
Truth makers.
III 219
Fact/Searle: a fact is something outside the statement that makes it true - a condition.
III 219ff
Fact/Strawson: a fact is that what is said, not something that is testified about. ((s) Like Brandom).
>
Fact/Brandom.
SearleVsStrawson: a fact is not a true statement. A fact has causal relation - several statements are possible for a fact. ((s) Like Austin).
>
Fact/Strawson, >
Fact/Austin.
- - -
V 145
Facts/situations/Searle: misleading: facts about an object. There can be no facts about an object identified independently of facts!
>
Fact/Wittgenstein, >
State of affairs/Wittgenstein.
Otherwise one approached the traditional substance (VsWittgenstein, Tractatus). Quantification via objects is misleading. It is better to say: "there are examples".
