Lexicon of Arguments

 Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
[german]


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Theses I
Theses II

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Rorty I 323
Language/Putnam/Rorty: like Wittgenstein and Goodman: language is seen as a reflection of the world, so any non-intentional relationship is not useful for the explanation of the acquisition and comprehension of language.
Cf. >Language evolution, >Language acquisition, >Understanding, >Intentionality.
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Horwich I 457
Language/Putnam: if language is only noise, then it is nothing but an expression of our subjectivity. Instead: correctness makes truth the appreciated concept in the inside view of the language game. RortyVsPlaton: but judgmental expressions are not names of esoteric entities.

(Richard Rorty (1986), "Pragmatism, Davidson and Truth" in E. Lepore (Ed.) Truth and Interpretation. Perspectives on the philosophy of Donald Davidson, Oxford, pp. 333-55. Reprinted in: Paul Horwich (Ed.) Theories of truth, Dartmouth, England USA 1994.)
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Putnam III 124
Language/intensional/Davidson: e.g. the new minister of scientific language has prohibited the use of words that relate to emotions, thoughts, and intentions. How do we know whether the command has been executed when the officer only speaks the new language? The new terms coming out of his mouth may play the same role as the old. This is similar to the use of color predicates.

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