Lexicon of Arguments

 

II 166
Psychologizing of language/Peacocke: Problem: there may be an infinite number of types of situations that are specified psychologically, in which a given semantic predicate is applicable, and which have nothing in common, that is specifiable with psychological vocabulary.
>Situations, >Behavior, >Vocabulary.
((s) Question: can you identify these infinitely psychological predicates as psychologically?)
PeacockeVsVs: it is not about reduction - the fine propositional adjustments do not have to be attributed before translation.
Vgl. >Reduction, >Reductionism.
II 168
Interpreted language/Peacocke: we get an interpreted language by using the T-scheme

T(s) ↔ p

plus performance relation 'sats' (uninterpreted itself) between rows of objects, and sentences.
>Interpretation, >Disquotational scheme, >Satisfaction.
II 171
Variant: a variant of this is an ordered pair whose first component is an interpreted language in the sense of the previous section and whose second component is a function of sentences of the first components to propositional adjustments. Then the listener takes the utterence as prima facie evidence.
>Prima facie, >Evidence.
II 168
Language/Community/Peacocke: we get a language community by the convention that the speaker only utters the sentence when he intends to (Schiffer ditto).
>Language community, >Language behavior, >Intention,
>Meaning/intending, >Language/Schiffer.
Problem: the attribution of a criterion presupposes already a theory by the speaker.
II 175
Language/Community/Convention/Peacocke: Problem: 'common knowledge': E.g. assuming English *: as English, except that the truth conditions are changed for an easy conjunction:

T (Susan is blond and Jane is small) ↔ Susan is blond.

>Truth conditions, >Conjunction.
Problem: if English is the actual language, then also English* would be the actual language at the same time - because it could be common knowledge that each member that believes p & q therefore believes also p.
>Conventions.