Nagel I 53
Wittgenstein, Solipsism: The truth of solipsism cannot be uttered, but is still shown in the fact that the world is always described in my language. In this language I cannot truly say that the world is my world, because that is wrong in my language.
Nagel: but all this is said in my language, and this shows that the world is my world in a deeper sense, although exactly this cannot be said.
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Hintikka I 96ff
World/Tractatus/Solipsism/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: question whether Wittgenstein's world is not irretrievably egocentric. Finally, the sense data means my sense data. >
Sense data, >
World.
I 97
Saying/Showing/Wittgenstein: 5,562 (entirety of all objects, limit of the world).. "question to what extent solipsism is a truth, what solipsism namely means, is quite correct, only it cannot be said, but it shows itself."
Hintikka: if we interpret the objects of the Tractatus as objects of my acquaintance, then Wittgenstein's cautious solipsism gets not only understandable but almost predictable.
I 98
Solipsism/Tractatus/Hintikka: is not metaphysical here, he does not depend on that the objects are assigned to any specific subjective awareness-dependent status. It is about their phenomenal condition, so that I can refer them to my language.
Nevertheless, what he considers as solipsism, has a specific content.
Realism/solipsism/Hintikka: however, the realism is right in its assertion that this "reduction to the acquaintance" has no impact in terms of the metaphysical reality of the rest of the world.
I 99
World/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: The relationship with me is not essential to the objects. "the ordinary way of speech could make a ((s) false) appearance as if the relationship with the owner of the hand would be something that is in the nature of the hand itself." ..therefore it might be useful, to give a hand a name during repeated use. (Philosophical Remarks VII. 71, 99f).
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II 132
Appearance/appear/seem/Wittgenstein: "It appears to appear" cannot be said. Solipsism and behaviorism are opposed to each other. >
Behaviorism, >
Appearance.
II 172
WittgensteinVsSolipsism: if it is logically impossible that someone else has a toothache, then it is just as impossible for me.
II 172/173
Solipsism/Wittgenstein: does not want a notation, in which the ego has a monopoly, but one in which the ego disappears.
II 178
Temporal solipsism/Russell/Wittgenstein: Russell E.g. the world was created five minutes ago. - This is not meaningless because there is a criterion - similar like in measurements. - E.g. "Every time there is no white rabbit sitting there." >
Criteria.
II 180
"Only the present is real": Problem: this pretends to give a picture that is in contrast with another picture. - But that does not succeed.
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VI 88
Solipsism/Wittgenstein/Schulte: to put my solipsistic position into words, I would have to be able to reach beyond both boundaries, of the world and the language - "My" is not opposed to "that". - Here we see that solipsism coincides with pure realism. >
World, >
Language, >
Limits.
