Lexicon of Arguments

 

Rorty VI 225
PragmatismVsSkepticism: (raw version): "We do not need to respond to skepticism at all; it makes no difference whether we respond to it or not". (WilliamsVs).
>Pragmatism.
- - -
Horwich I 447
Skepticism/Peirce/Rorty/Leeds: PeirceVsIdealism/PeirceVsPhysicalism: both have a common error, "correspondence" a relation between pieces of thoughts and pieces of the world that must be ontologically homogeneous.
Ontological homogeneity: e.g. only relations between representations, not between representations and objects.
>Skepticism/Berkeley).
Peirce: this homogeneity does not need to exist.
PlantingaVsPeirce: it does if the objects can only exist, for example, by showing their structure.
RortyVsPlantinga: this confuses a criterion with a causal explanation.
RortyVsPeirce: "ideal" unclear.
>Criteria, >Causal explanation.
I 448
Solution/James: "true of" is not an analyzable relation. - Therefore correspondence is dropped.
>Correspondence, >Skepticism/James.
Solution/Dewey: It’s just an attempt to interpose language as an intermediary instance, which would make the problem appear interesting.
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Rorty I 129
Skepticism/Tradition/RortyVsDescartes: not whether others are in pain is interesting - skepticism would never have become interesting, if the concept of "naturally given" had not arisen.
>Skepticism/Descartes.
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VI 223ff
Skepticism: main representative: Stroud. Stroud: speaks of a serious ongoing problem.
>Skepticism/Stroud.
Michael WilliamsVsStroud: the problem arises only from absurd totality demand: that everything must be explained together.
>Skepticism/Michael Williams.
Rorty: statements only make sense in a situation.