Lexicon of Arguments

Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
[german]


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Theses I
Theses II

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Dummett III 56 ff
Sense/Frege: two arguments:
1) The sentence is the smallest unit.
2) Truth plays the crucial role in explaining the meaning.
>Fregean sense, >Fregean meaning.
Sense: sense is part of the meaning and relevant for truth or falsehood. The meaning of a sentence, as such, does not determine the truth. So the sense only determines the truth conditions.
Truth also depends on nature of the world. When sense determines the semantic value, the contribution of the world is already presumed.
Dummett III 64
Sense/Reference/Frege: the argument (a sentence is the smallest unit of sense) has two premises:
a) all predicative knowledge is based on propositional knowledge,
b) for certain predicative knowledge there is more than just one proposition.
Therefore, no mere knowledge of the reference is possible.
Dummett III 74
Sense/Dummett: sense is not only acquired by verification method, but by understanding the circumstances which must be realized (e.g. Goldbach’s conjecture).
Sense/reference/bivalence/Dummett: bivalence: Problem: not every sentence has such a sense that we can, in principle, recognize it as true if it is true (unicorn, Goldbach’s conjecture). But Frege’s argument does not depend on bivalence.
>Bivalence.
Dummett III 76
Bivalence does apply, however, for elementary propositions: if the semantic value here is the extension, it does not have to be decided whether the predicate is true or not. It may not be possible to effectively decide the application, but the (undefined) predicate can be understood without being able to allocate the semantic value (here truth value). Therefore, there is a distinction between sense and semantic value.
Dummett III 133
Sense/Frege/Dummett: sense is constituted by the manner of givenness but it is not identical with it.
- - -
Husted V 100f
Meaning/sense/Frege/Husted: if both were equal, a sentence could not say anything that everyone who knows the name did not know already. The meaning of a name: is the object. The fact that a name stands for an object is a result, not part of the fact that it has a purpose.
V 103
Frege: the sense of the sentence is the truth condition >Understanding/Dummett, >Understanding/Wittgenstein - Understanding, knowing what must be the case.

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