Lexicon of Arguments

 

V 274
Perception/Seeing/Match/Lewis: certainly does not mean that the same is going on in the mind or the soul as before one’s eyes, rather it is about the informational content.
Visual experience: is best characterized by the typical causal role.
>Causal role/Lewis.
The content is the content of the belief, which tends to be caused by it.
>Content/Lewis.
Problem: the same visual experience can cause very different beliefs - but not all the content can be characterized by belief.
E.g. Rabbit-Duck-Head: the belief can be characterized by the disjunction rabbit or duck, but then results in the belief that there are ink and paper.
>Experience/Lewis, >Belief/Lewis, >Rabbit-duck-head/Lewis.
V 275
Hallucination/Lewis: not seeing, because the scene did not cause the experience. - E.g. If I hallucinated my brain and it just happens to be in accordance. t’s my brain that causes this, but it’s not the same as seeing. - (>veridical).
V 280
Seeing/Grice: requires a causal standard process.
V 281
Hallucination: no real counterfactual dependence on the scene - if it changes, the hallucination does not necessarily have to change - the other way around: congruence with real seeing: not caused by the scene itself.
V 280
Seeing/Perception/Kripke/Lewis: (Kripke 1972)⁽¹⁾ LewisVsGrice: causal standard process would lead to the fact that no one knew enough about reflection in the past to be able to have had a concept about seeing. Solution/Kripke: descriptions made rigid.
>Description/Kripke, >Rigidity/Kripke.
V 283
Seeing/Lewis: is distinguishing - but: perfect match - e.g. in a dark scene - that would allow a wide range of alternatives - which is undesirable. - Seeing a dark scene is not seeing.


1.Saul A. Kripke, Naming and Necessity, in: Davidson/Harmann (eds.) (1972), 253-355