Lexicon of Arguments

 

I 83f
Pain/Descartes: pain are particulars RortyVs).
Their being is constituted in a single property: painfulness.
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I 93f
Pain/Kripke/Rorty: difference:
a) heat: Even in the absence of heat you can feel heat - (same epistemic situation)
b) Not so in the case of pain.
Difference: a) reference in heat is determined by an accidental property - b) in pain: by an essential property.
>Pain/Kripke, cf. >Necessity a posteriori.
I 127 f
E.g. The not yet speaking child knows in the same way that it is in pain, as the plant knows the direction of the sun and the amoeba the temperature of the water.
Knowledge: this way of knowledge, however, is unrelated to what a user of language knows, if he knows what pain is.
Wittgenstein: it is a mistake to think that we learn what pain is in this second sense in putting our knowledge, of what pain in the first sense is, in a linguistic construct.
>Linguistic disguise.
I 128
Wittgensteinians: make a fuss about the facts about behavior and environment.
RortyVs: these are irrelevant to the nature of pain. Because the nature of pain is simply determined by what is named.
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VI 172
Rorty: Pain, people and beliefs (I'm not so sure with hairstyles) are not entities, about which one can learn to talk by obtaining succinct definitions.
>Definition.