Hintikka I 53
Simple sentence/elementary proposition/Atomic sentence/Wittgenstein/Tractatus/Hintikka: a sentence of the form "(Ex, y, R).xRy" is unanalysable. >
Atomic sentence, >
Atomism.
I 128
Sentence/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: the most important thing that can be said about these sentences is indeed their truth conditions. When are they true? >
Truth conditions.
3.1432: the sentence "aRb" is then true if the relationship in the world, which corresponds to the "R" ... if the complex matches the configuration of the objects that is represented by these three linguistic entities (named). >
Mapping/Sellars.
More general: 3.21 The configuration of simple punctuation corresponds to the configuration of the objects in the situation".
4.024 To understand a sentence means to know what the case is, if it is true.
Hintikka: this gives rise to several very interesting questions:
I 128/129
1. Wittgenstein has a different expression for the relationship between the elementary proposition and the fact that is represented by it.
"The sentence is a picture of reality, the sentence is a model of reality as we imagine it." (4.01)
"The sentence is a picture of reality, because I know the represented situation by it, if I do not understand the sentence."
Hintikka: the picture relationship that helps to understand the sentence (elementary proposition) is exactly the same as the relationship which makes the sentence true.
2. Picture/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: the "pictures" in the Tractatus are actually not very pictorially. They are rather what mathematicians call "isomorphic representation" or illustration.
Picture/sentence/sign/Wittgenstein: "It is obvious that we perceive a sentence like "aRb" as a picture. Here the sign is obviously a likeness of the signified."
Picture/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: it may be that the whole picture theory of Russell's Principia Mathematica
(1) has been excited.
I 130
3. It is apparent that the isomorphism condition makes hardly any sense as long as the entities of different logical types, individuals, properties or relationships are not represented in the language by expressions of the same type: individuals by individuals, relations by relations, etc.
I 287
Picture/sentence/reality/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: late: the sentence is no longer a picture of the world - but a provision for the preparation of images - also not a base of unique name relations anymore - a language game always links several expressions with the world.
I 292
Tractatus: picture relation prior - later: only from language games. >
Language games.
I 294
Sentence/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: for a sentence, there is no ostensive definition - instead the structure must be articulated - this is not about a similarity - the sentence is a picture without resemblance. - That it is a picture of something that is in the intention.
I 298
WittgensteinVsTractatus: "conformity with the form" was a mistake. >
Picture theory.
I 301
To the sentence belongs everything that is part of the projection. But not what is projected. - ((s) So also the provision).
1. Whitehead, A.N. and Russel, B. (1910). Principia Mathematica. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
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II 44
Sentence/Wittgenstein: every expression that can be negated meaningfully is a sentence.
II 232
Sentence/Wittgenstein: there is no general concept of the sentence - they do not all have something in common - instead family resemblance. >
Similarity.
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VI 117
Apparant-sentences/Tractatus/Schulte: are nonsense, because they indicate formal terms such as "object", "sentence" or "number" and others not trough variables, but claim to use "actual" term words. - (Admittedly Wittgenstein uses them permanently because they help to get insights) - they are nonsense because the formal term is already given with the object - one cannot introduce both at the same time. - E.g. "1 is a number" (4.12721). >
Circular reasoning.
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IV 21
Sentence/Tractatus/Wittgenstein: the meaning is not yet contained in the sentence - but the form of its sense - but not its content. >
Meaning, >
Content.
