Brandom I 923
Representation/SearleVsDavidson: content must be intrinsic. Content of beliefs and intentions must be understood before the analysis of the use is done. According to this model, the content cannot be transmitted through the use.
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Intrinsic, >
Extrinsic, >
Contents, >
Intentional Contents, >
Use, >
Use theory.
Searle/characters: sounds coming out of the mouth and characters on paper, are mere objects in the world. Their representation capacity is not intrinsic but derived from the intentionality of the mind.
The intentionality of the mind in turn is not derived from any prior intentionality, it is an intrinsic property of these states themselves.
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Intentionality, >
Signs.
Someone uses a sentence to convey an idea. In this sense, he/she does not use his/her ideas and beliefs and desires: he/she simply has them.
Belief: belief is a representation. It consists of an intentional content and a psychological mode. It is wrong, that there must be a person who must use any entity as a representation, so that there is a representation at all. This applies to sentences, characters and images, (i.e. derived intentionality) but not for intentional states. (> More autors on
representation).
Representation needs background of non-representational skills. The compositionality principle without background is not sufficient.
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Compositionality.
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Searle I 271
Pattern: patterns play in functional terms a causal role, but do not guarantee an unconscious representation (intentionality).
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II 28 f
Representation: speech acts and intentional states have this in common: no pictures, but propositional contents. Key to understanding: are the fulfilment conditions - from representation follows no ontology. Recognition needs not to contain representation.
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Speech acts, >
Ontology.
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III 185
Representation: each representation is bound to certain aspects, not to others.
III 197f
Representations are private, language is public.
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Language.
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I 195
Existence: is a truth condition. Possible existence: comprehensibility condition.
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Existence/Searle.
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Graesser I125
Representation/Searle: an object X represents a situation A, when a subject S is available, that intends that X represents A.
