Lexicon of Arguments

Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
[german]


Complaints - Corrections

Table
Concepts
Versus
Sc. Camps
Theses I
Theses II

Concept/Author*  

What is wrong?
Page
Other metadata
Translation
Excerpt or content
Other

Correction: Year / Place / Page
/ /

Correction:
(max 500 charact.)

Your username*
or User-ID

Email address*

The complaint
will not be published.

 
I 162
Representation/Rorty: requires judgment - unlike impressions (sensory impressions).
>Judgements, >Sensory impressions.
SellarsVsLocke: Locke puts both together.
I 278f
Rorty: representation, as it used by the psychologist is ambiguous: it includes images and propositions as well as opinions. Only the latter two are used as premises.
Images, however, are abrupt. British empiricism threw them together. RortyVsRepresentation: the thesis of the system of internal representations is not just a mix of images and propositions, but a general confusion of causing events and conclusions!
>Beliefs/Rorty.
But it takes place in the minds of philosophers, not of the psychologists.
- - -
II (c) 76
Camps:
Anti-representationalism: with Nietzsche and Dewey. - On the other hand: later Wittgenstein, Sellars, Davidson: new perspective on language and reality.
>Nietzsche, >Dewey, >Wittgenstein, >Wilfrid Sellars, >Davidson.
- - -
II (e) 112
PragmatismVsRepesentationalism/Rorty: there is no fixed, final truth, which would have to be represented.
PragmatismVsCorrespondence theory: there is no privileged language of representation.
>Pragmatism, >Correspondence theory.
- - -
VI 45
Representation/realism/Rorty: representation involves realism.
>Realism.
VI 51
R/Wittgenstein/Rorty: the relevant object range is never "there" in the relevant sense -
VI 49
Representation/RortyVsWright: fundamentally different outputs can be considered a representation of the same input. Basically, everything can be an arbitrary R of anything, you just have to agree in advance.
VI 54
Representation/McDowell’s Wittgenstein/Rorty: thesis the bewildering variety of rules makes it impossible to draw an interesting line between the discourses in terms of representationality or non-representationality. ((s) knowledge, morality, the comic, etc.).
>McDowell's Wittgenstein.
RortyVsKripke: Kripke’s Wittgenstein answered that with a petitio principii.
>Kripke's Wittgenstein.
VI 63
Representation/PutnamVsRepresentation/Rorty: Language penetrates too deeply into the world -
VI 71f
Putnam: still uses the term representation. RortyVs.
R/Rorty: we should not understand our relationship to the rest of the universe in representational terms but in purely causal terminology. (PutnamVs).
DavidsonVsRepresentation: language and research can be explained by exclusive reference to causal interactions with the world. Representation unnecessary. (McDowellVsDavidson: responsibility to the world.)
>Judgment/McDowell.
VI 107f
Representation/image/Rorty: equally ambiguous: of course, an able historian reproduces the facts the way they are! So there is a notion of representation, which allows to distinguish efficient from less efficient historians.
But when philosophers argue about the accuracy of a representation, they do not only argue about sincerity or diligence. It’s more about the question: can we pair pieces of the world and pieces of beliefs or sentences in such a way that we are able to state that the relations between the latter correspond to the relations between the former?
VI 125 f
RortyVsRepresentation: even if you are against representationalism, that does not mean to deny that most things in the universe are independent from us in causal terms. They are only not in a representational way independent from us!
>Metaphysical realism.
VI 130
Representation/Language/RortyVsSellars: language does not represent anything.
>Language/Rorty, >Language.
VI 139
Representation/knowledge/Rorty: epistemological interpretation: knowledge as an image of the object: separation. - In contrast, dealing with the object: no separation between object and handling.
VI 140
Language/R/Rorty: Thesis: language and knowledge have nothing to do with illustration, but rather with coping.
Charles Taylor: handling. Coping is more primary than representation.
Rorty: no break between linguistic and non-linguistic coping.

Found an error? Use our Complaint Form. Perhaps someone forgot to close a bracket? A page number is wrong?
Help us to improve our lexicon.
However, if you are of a different opinion, as regards the validity of the argument, post your own argument beside the contested one.
The correction will be sent to the contributor of the original entry to get his opinion about.