II 44
Theory: rewording: E.g. assuming, we swap electron and molecule - any empirical statement (with theoretical term) is rated opposite - solution: we mark the theoretical terms and assign them to the two theories: then no problem, no relativism.
- - -
V 89
Relative Identity/Geach: (Geach, Reference and generality, p. 39f)
(1): Identity only makes sense with regard to a general term such as "the same dog".
QuineVsGeach: this certainly applies to the beginning of language learning.
Identity/Showing/Pointing/Quine: Problem: there is no point in showing twice and saying, "This is the same as that". Then one could still ask. "The same what?"
Example: One could have pointed once at the dog and once only at the ear.
Solution: You can easily say a is identical to b. Whether a is the same dog or the same ear depends on whether a is a dog or an ear.
QuineVsGeach: this makes his relativism untenable once you get used to the identity speech.
Identity/Quine: but is still relative in a deeper sense.
1. Geach, Peter T., Reference and Generality, Ithaca: Cornell University Press (1962)
- - -
II 44
Relativity of Theories/Quine: A theory formulation merely implies its categorical observational sentences without being implied by them. Therefore, the observation conditionals implied by two theory formulations can all be identical without the formulations implying each other.
II 45
Let us assume that in a situation there is no possibility of harmonisation by reinterpretation of the terms. We would probably not know that they are empirically equivalent. Because that they are, one usually gets out by the discovery of such a reinterpretation. Nevertheless, we want to assume that they are empirically equivalent.
Further assumed: all categorical observations are de facto true, although this is not known either. Further conditions for the truth of one theory or the other certainly cannot be set.
Question: are they both true? Quine: I say yes.
But even they can be logically incompatible despite their empirical equivalence, which raises the spectre of >
cultural relativism. Because each of them is obviously only true from its point of view.
QuineVsCultural Relativism: The spectre can easily be dispelled: by a step that is as trivial as the interchange of "electron" and "molecule": Since the two theoretical formulations are incompatible, they have to evaluate a certain sentence in the opposite direction.
Since they are nevertheless empirically equivalent, this sentence must contain terms that are not sufficiently determined by observation criteria.
Then we might as well pick out one of these terms and treat it as if it were two independent words, one belonging to one theory, the other to another.
II 46
We could indicate this by the notation. By consistently maintaining this spelling, we could resolve any conflict between these theories. From then on, both could be accepted as terminologically different true descriptions of one and the same world. The threat of truth relativism has been averted.
- - -
XI 121
QuineVsCultural Relativism/Lauener: is contradictory in itself.
