I 51
Each kind of reference can be understood with the help of self-attribution.
1) The one who means must be able to make himself an object;
2) He must understand propositions and facts;
Direct attribution (self-attribution) is the original form of all attribution.
I 133
But this is not yet self-consciousness: in addition, we need knowledge that it is the subject itself, to which the property is attributed. >
Self-consciousness, >
Self-ascription.
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II 24
real/Rutte: for calling something real: conditions: 1) this way of appearing, - 2) arranged in the way it appears - 3) the right causation. - Reality must be distinguished from the outside the world. >
World.
Rutte, Heiner. Mitteilungen über Wahrheit und Basis empirischer Erkenntnis, mit besonderer Berücksichtigung des Wahrnehmungs- und Außenweltproblems. In: M.David/L. Stubenberg (Hg) Philosophische Aufsätze zu Ehren von R.M. Chisholm Graz 1986
- - -
II 112/113
Reference/Brandl: other way of reference, depending on whether description or acquaintance - the latter allows reference without information, or even to ignore information - BrandlVsRussell: different motivation of the distinction. Between the appearance of the object and our knowledge of how the object is the cause of the phenomenon. Description allows us to exceed the limits of our experience
II 105f
Reference/Reference/Brandl: by sign or speaker? by speaker - Strawson: dito, so use of the sign refers, not the sign - problem: intentionality would have to explain sign.
BrandlVsChisholm: thesis: it is no use to decide whether the linguistic or psychological (intentionality) should have primacy.
Directedness is incomprehensible if the designation of the words has not yet been introduced. -
A separation of the areas would either lead to total behaviorism or psychologism. >
Behaviorism, >
Psychologism.
II 107
"Unity" would also not explain anything. - Also here question about primacy: either "thinking of" or talking about objects. - Solution: differentiate different kinds of singular term for different types of reference - but only a kind of intentionality. >
Intentionality.
II 108
Domain/Russell: non-singular propositions are always related to a domain of objects, not unambiguous - singular propositions: contain the object as a genuine component" (by acquaintance).>
Acquaintance.
QuineVsRussell: confusion of mention and use. >
Domains, >
Use, >
Mention.
Brandl, Johannes. Gegen den Primat des Intentionalen. In: M.David/L. Stubenberg (Hg) Philosophische Aufsätze zu Ehren von R.M. Chisholm Graz 1986
