Lexicon of Arguments

Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
[german]


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Sc. Camps
Theses I
Theses II

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III 52 ff (where?)
Justification: the traditional concept of justification in epistemology is reductionistic and atomistic. >reduction.
Reductionism/Freud: he does not tell us that art is actually sublimation, that philosophical system formation is just paranoia or religion merely misguided memory.
IV 48 ff
"Anti-reductionism": reduction is no relationship between ontological categories, but only between linguistic circumstances. a) Who (linguistically) speaks of X does not necessarily speak of Y. b) Every description in an X terminology applies only to things to which also a description in a Y terminology refers. But this type of reduction does not mean that "X things are nothing but Y things".
There is nothing that could show this. "An X is what it is, and no other thing." (Buttler).
The only possibility to show that there are no X things would be to show that there are no such sentences! (X and Y only stylistic variants).
Folk Psychology: will continue to be the most appropriate way to talk about us. We will keep "beliefs" and "desires" in our vocabulary. They are proven tools.
VI 138f
Def reductionism/Rorty: there is not a single network, but also a single, privileged description of all entities included in the network. The reductionist believes that we do not only need causal unity, but also unity of explanation: A process to make all attempts at explanation commensurable and provide true nomological statements through which all these entities (thoughts, neurons, sins, hormones, actions and movements, persons and organisms) are interlinked.
RortyVsReduktionism: we have learned from Davidson to be content with token-token identities between differently described objects.
VI 139
Reductionism/Rorty: believes that there is only one correct description -" so that all explanations are comparable -

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