Lexicon of Arguments

 

I 184
In order for knowledge to be justified, the naturalistic part of the theory must supply the basis for a normative reconstruction of our beliefs.
>Belief.
Question: would this theory be metatheoretically accessible?
But the solution of the naturalistic aspect does not automatically solve the normative aspect: it could be that we draw up a complete theory of the natural base of the faculties of the mind without getting a theory of the applicability of normative terms such as "knowledge" and "justification".
I 184/85
Justification/Belief/Knowledge/McGinn: Then the transcendental could come into play on a purely normative level, because it would be possible that we do not understand by means of which normative principles produce the totality of natural facts underlying our beliefs produce knowledge in the proper sense.
>Transcendentals.
That means, it could be that although we understand how we "factually" come to our beliefs, we do not have access to what justifies these beliefs.
I 184/85
Knowledge/McGinn: there is no a priori reason to believe that the capability of our first-stage knowledge systems can be imitated at the level of meta-theory.
>Levels(Order), >Description level.
I 186
A reasonably naturalistic conception of our cognitive faculties would even suggest just the opposite.
I 185
E.g. language: from our ability to learn our native tongue very quickly does not follow that we even remotely understand the principles of this learning ability.