Lexicon of Arguments

Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
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Theses I
Theses II

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McDowell I 37
Justification/Davidson: nothing can justify a belief, which is not itself a belief. >Beliefs/Davidson.
Experience cannot justify beliefs. It is outside the space of concepts. Thus we would fall for the myth (of the given). >Experience, >myth of the given.
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I 95
DavidsonVsCarnap: Philosophy has made the mistake of assuming that any justification of empirical knowledge must be based on sensory experience. >Sensory impressions, >Perception.
I 96
If this is true, epistemology has no need for purely private subjective objects of consciousness. While sensory experience plays a major role in the causal process by which beliefs are connected to the world, it is a mistake to believe that it plays an epistemological role in determining the content of these beliefs.
>Causality/Davidson, >Content, >Propositional content, >Objects of thought.

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