Lexicon of Arguments

 

I 41
Modal Realism/Stalnaker: thesis: there are possible worlds. VsModal Realism: objection: it is not possible, to know any metaphysical facts about modal realism (whether a possible world exist).
>Metaphysics.
Thesis: there is no strategy to counter this objection that would be analog to VsBenacerraf.
Benacerraf: there is a tension between the need for a plausible representation of mathematical statements and the representation of our respective knowledge about their truth.
>Paul Benacerraf.
I 42
Platonism: the platonism gives plausible semantics but no epistemology. Reference/Benacerraf: thesis: a reference needs a causal link. LewisVsBenacerraf: this does not apply to abstract objects such as numbers and so on.
>Mathematical entities.
I 47
Conclusion: we cannot distinguish platonism in terms of mathematical objects from that in terms of possible worlds.
>Platonism.
I 49
Modal Realism/VsMR/possible world/Stalnaker: problem: the modal realism cannot say on the one hand that possible worlds are things of the same kind as the real world (contingent physical objects) and on the other hand, that possible worlds are things of which we know in the same way as of numbers, etc.
Modal Realism: modal realism will insist on the fact that even the reference to ordinary objects (actual or merely possible) needs no causal connection.