Lexicon of Arguments

 

II 87
Realism, naive/SearleVs: naive realism is right that the material objects and experiences are the typical objects of perception. But the realism overlooks the fact that they can only be it because perception has an intentional content.
II 199
Realism/Searle: realism has no hypothesis or belief, realism belongs to the background.
>Terminology/Searle.
I am set to the background. Realism is a prerequisite for hypotheses and being determined to realism itself is not a hypothesis.
- - -
III 160f
External Realism/Searle: external realism must still differ between representation-independent (e.g. stars) and mind-independent (also stars), e.g. pain is representation-independent but not mind-independent.
Cf. >Internal realism.
III 165
Realism/Searle: thesis: realism says that there is an independent reality, not about how it is designed, no theory of language, no theory of representation, but ontological.
III 163f
Realism/Searle: realism should not be confused with the correspondence theory, it is no theory of truth but a condition for our hypotheses. It is compatible with any truth theory because it is a theory of ontology and not the meaning of "true". There is no semantic theory. Putnam understands realism epistemically: the realism asserts that it would be reasonable to assume a divine standpoint. SearleVsPutnam: accepting a mistake that reality determines itself what vocabulary is appropriate.
III 165
Searle: realism is not a theory of language. VsTradition: N.B.: realism is not a theory about how the world "really" is. Reason: we could be wrong about all the details, and the realism can nevertheless be true. Definition realism/Searle: the view that there is a way of being of the things that is logically independent of all representations, it does not say how things are.
III 166
Realism/Searle: arguments against the existence of things are claims about the external reality like any other. They presuppose the realism just as others do. The non-existence of things ((s) "out there") would be a property of that representation-independent reality.
III 191
External Realism/Searle: external realism is a condition for understanding other hypotheses.
III 193 ff
Realism: thesis: realism has no hypothesis, but conditions for any hypotheses. Realism is part of the background.
>Background/Searle.