Rorty I 305ff
Anti-Realist/Putnam/Rorty: an anti-realist understands ancient and our modern theories not as two approximately correct descriptions of a solid inventory, but he/she does not believe that our theory is better in relation to the same entities. But if our theory is merely our theory, we could instead use it just as well as the Neanderthals.
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Antirealism.
PutnamVsAnti-Realism: the problem is that for him truth is only useful as a theories subordinate term. But extension is inextricably linked with truth: x is then precisely part of the extension of a predicate F if "x is an F" is true. Internal realism: (according to Rorty): is a position according to which we "mundane fact" that the use of language contributes to achieve our goals, to our satisfaction etc. It can be explained by the fact that "not the language but the speaker reflects the world in that they produce a symbolic representation of their environment".
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Internal realism.
Putnam: by means of our conventions, we constitute the universe better than ever before.
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Conventions.
PutnamVsRealism/PutnamVsRelativism/Rorty: both assume one could simultaneously be both inside and outside the language
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Relativism.
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Putnam VI 389
Realism/Putnam: realism explains why theories tend to convergence. Realism means that not language but speakers depict the world.
VI 395 f
Realism/fact/Putnam: e.g.
Story 1: a line can be divided into points, that is, into smaller and smaller segments. Then there is the same relation "part of" between points and segments and segments and larger segments.
Story 2: there are no points, but these are logical constructions. "Hard core" realism: the "hard core" realism would say that there is a fact here that decides about it.
PutnamVsMetaphysical Realism: "refined realism": 1 and 2 are equivalent descriptions.
VI 398
Metaphysical Realism: if you cannot say, how the WORLD theory is independent, the talk of various descriptions (e.g. point or converging segment) becomes empty - this is stated b Quine in ontological relativity.
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Metaphysical realism, >
Ontological rellativity.
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Putnam VI 404
PutnamVsMetaphysical Realism: metaphysical realism is doomed to a) to consider the logic either empirically (i.e. not merely revisable, as I believe it) but in the sense that it has no conventional component at all, or - b) it has the logic for a priori i.e. not explainable by the notion of convention.
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Putnam I (c) 78
Realism/Putnam: realism must left it inexplicable that e.g. spacetime calculi predict observable phenomena correctly when there is no curved spacetime in reality. What has prediction to do with truth then?
I (c) 95
Realism: a realistic conception of connectives ensures that a statement is not true solely because it follows any theory.
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Junctions, >
Connectives.
I (g) 175f
PutnamVsMetaphysical Realism: metaphysical realism faces infinitely many correspondences. There are endless possibilities how signs and things can correspond. Problem: to choose the right correspondence, without a metaphysical access. ((s)>
Loewenheim, >
Unintended models.
