Lexicon of Arguments

Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
[german]


Complaints - Corrections

Table
Concepts
Versus
Sc. Camps
Theses I
Theses II

Concept/Author*  

What is wrong?
Page
Other metadata
Translation
Excerpt or content
Other

Correction: Year / Place / Page
/ /

Correction:
(max 500 charact.)

Your username*
or User-ID

Email address*

The complaint
will not be published.

 
Horwich I 54
Proposition/Russell: is a complex entity with components: E.g. Smith is taller than Brown: Smith, Brown, the relation taller than - E.g. Brown is smaller than Smith: is therefore equivalent, but is different in all three components! - Letter to Frege: the mountain literally appears in the proposition - Cartwright: thoughts/Frege: are not the same as Russell’s propositions - they do not contain their objects - ((s) ."...but their sense").
Horwich I 56
Proposition/Russell/Cartwright: how can a proposition be wrong if it consists of the components and the nature of their connection? - Solution/Russell: another quality.
CartwrightVs: which had already been rejected.
Horwich I 59
Proposition/Principia Mathematica(2)/Russell: φ x (requires function) - Propositional function: φ x^ - not ambiguous - the values ​​are all propositions of the form j x.
>Propositional function.
Horwich I 60
I.e. the symbol φ (φx^) must not express a proposition as does indeed, if a is a value for φ x^ - indeed j(jx^) must be a symbol that expresses nothing, it is pointless - (neither true nor false) - E.g. -the function- is a human is a human.
>Levels/Order.
Horwich I 60f
Proposition/propositional function/Principia Mathematica/Russell: The symbol (x).j x shall always express the proposition φ x, i.e. the proposition that claims all values ​​for φ x^.
Horwich I 61
This proposition presupposes the function j x^, not just an ambiguous value of the function - the assertion of φ x, where x is not specified, is different from that which claims all values for φ x^, because the former is an ambiguous assertion, and the latter is not ambiguous in any sense. (1)

1. R. Cartwright, „A Neglected Theory of Truth“ , Philosophical Essays, Cambridge/MA pp. 71-93 in: Paul Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth, Aldershot 1994
2. Whitehead, A.N. and Russel, B. (1910). Principia Mathematica. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- - -
Russell I 125
Proposition/Function/Extensional/Tractatus/Wittgenstein: functions of propositions are always truth functions - a function can only occur in a proposition by means of its values. (see above ​​extensional).
>Truth function, >Extension.
Consequence: all functions of functions are extensional.
E.g. A believes p is not a function of p - (Tractatus 19-20).
((s) VsRussell: (see above) > Waverley, functions are equivalent, but not identical, because George IV did not want to know if Scott = Scott - ((s) being believed is not a function of the believed object) - ((s)> extrinsic properties, extrinsic) - ((s)> Function of a function of higher level).

Found an error? Use our Complaint Form. Perhaps someone forgot to close a bracket? A page number is wrong?
Help us to improve our lexicon.
However, if you are of a different opinion, as regards the validity of the argument, post your own argument beside the contested one.
The correction will be sent to the contributor of the original entry to get his opinion about.