Lexicon of Arguments

 

I 235
Predicate/property/realism/Schiffer: realism assumes (erroneously) that predicate and property are in the same relation as name and object.
>Proper names, >Object, >Predication, >Attribution.
Vs: there is no entity "the property to be modest".
Solution: the understanding of
"Mother Teresa is modest"
only requires knowledge of Teresa, not of modesty.
Properties/Schiffer: do not exist, they are not to find among the things which exist.
Cf. >Existence/Quine, >Properties/Quine.
But: in a loose sense ("there is", substitutional quantification) there are properties.
Nominalism: logical form of "Teresa is modest": Fa instead of Fab.
Schiffer: nominalism should nevertheless accept: E.g. "there is something that Teresa has, namely modesty" - but not: E.g. what Al and Betty have in common.
Solution/Schiffer: substitutional quantification: a substitution instance of "Teresa has X" is true.
>Substitutional quantification.
I 236
There are/exist/substitutional quantification/Lycan: (1979)⁽¹⁾: Allowes for example: "there are many things that do not exist". E.g. the monster of Loch Ness, etc ...
>Nonexistence.


1. William G. Lycan (1979). "The trouble with possible worlds". In: Michael J. Loux (ed.), The Possible and the Actual. Cornell University Press