Lexicon of Arguments

Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
[german]


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Concepts
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Sc. Camps
Theses I
Theses II

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Frank I 142ff
Perspective/Nagel: is not something that is only accessible to a single individual - it is rather a type.
((s) If we were unable to take the perspective of someone else, we would not know what the concept means - If perspective belonged only to us, the concept would exist just as little as Wittgenstein’s Beetle).
>Beetle example.
I 145
Nagel: it is the concepts which are bound to perspective, not the physical structure. - Hence the different structure of the bat(1) is not an argument against understanding. - We can give up our perspective in favor of another and yet mean same things.(1)


1. Thomas Nagel (1974): What Is It Like to Be a Bat?, in: The Philosophical Review 83 (1974), 435-450
- - -
I 52
Perspective/subjectivity/Nagel: there is no place where the perspectivist could settle.
- - -
Peacocke I 167
I/Nagel: I am not truer from one point of of view than from another. - The world contains no points of view - no facts of the first person.
>First Person, >World, >World/thinking, >Objectivity/Nagel.

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