Lexicon of Arguments

Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
[german]


Complaints - Corrections

Table
Concepts
Versus
Sc. Camps
Theses I
Theses II

Concept/Author*  

What is wrong?
Page
Other metadata
Translation
Excerpt or content
Other

Correction: Year / Place / Page
/ /

Correction:
(max 500 charact.)

Your username*
or User-ID

Email address*

The complaint
will not be published.

 
I 131
Definition person/Strawson: type of entity to which can be attributed both: states of consciousness and physical properties.
>Attribution, >Properties, >Consciousness, >Body.
I 132
"simple, pure" subject cannot be fundamental concept, because we cannot get from there to others and also not to self-attribution.
>Subject, >Self-ascription.
I 133
Person/Strawson: The word "I" refers to something, because I am a person among others - the concept of the person is logically primary against the concept of the individual consciousness.
>I, Ego, Self/Strawson, >Intersubjectivity, >Community.
I 134
Person logical primitive - not secondary to consciousness and body.
>Basic concepts.
I 134
M-predicates/Strawson: predicate that can be correctly applied to purely mathematical bodies: E.g. "weighs 5 kg" "is in the living room" - P-predicates applicable to persons: E.g. "smile", "suffer pain", "go for a walk", "believe in God".
>Predicates/Strawson.
I 135
Condition: logical criterion for the application, not only observation.
I 135
Strawson: Person/I/subject: not type-ambiguous - only predicates type-ambigous - only persons are attributed both types: P-predicate and M-predicate.

Found an error? Use our Complaint Form. Perhaps someone forgot to close a bracket? A page number is wrong?
Help us to improve our lexicon.
However, if you are of a different opinion, as regards the validity of the argument, post your own argument beside the contested one.
The correction will be sent to the contributor of the original entry to get his opinion about.