Lexicon of Arguments

 

Graeser I 58f
Meaning/Wittgenstein: "What is meaning?", "What is length?" "What is the number one?" Here we cannot point to anything, although we should point out something - Problem: "nominalization": makes us look for a thing. >Definitions, >Definability.
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Hintikka I 228
Ostension/Definition/Learning/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: pointing/showing - legacy of the Tractatus "showing" - can certainly serve as the only method for defining sense data.
But as soon as inaccessible objects (atoms) are added, it is no longer sufficient. >Learning.
Showing/WittgensteinVsShowing/Ostension/Hintikka: Problem: Example: How to show the state of California? (>Definition, >Indicative definition.)
Even if Wittgenstein claims on the first page of the Blue Book that all non-verbal definitions are indicative definitions, he immediately limits this:
I 229
"Does the indicative definition itself need to be understood?"
The listener must probably already know the logical status of the defined entity.
For example, it is not possible to point out a non-existent object, even if you are telephoning someone who sees it. The same applies to other people's immediate experiences.
And if one thinks that even the words "there" and "this" for their part are to be introduced by indicative explanation, then this indicative indication must be quite different from the usual indicative explanation. (PU §§ 9,38). >Explanation.
I 237
Ostension/Pointing/Indicative Definition/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: one and the same gesture can serve for a person's name, the name for a mass term, a number word, etc. - therefore showing cannot connect to reality. It is just a calculus. It is at most, a connection between written or spoken language on the one hand and sign language on the other.