Lexicon of Arguments

 Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
[german]


Complaints - Corrections

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Theses I
Theses II

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I 166
Logic/Ontology/Crispin Wright: instead of logical equivalence (e.g., between Platonist propositions on directions and nominalistic propositions on parallel lines): "conceptual necessity" - from a conceptual explanation.
>Necessity, >Equivalence, >Explanation.
If Fx is a (finally instantiated) term, then there is a thing so that hx:Fx.
FieldVsWright: that would also apply to God.
Solution: Conditional: "If there is a God ...".
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II 102
Properties/Ontology/Philosophy of mind/Field: in the philosophy of mind, one can assume certain properties that are simultaneously denied in the ontology.
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III 3
Physics/Ontology/Field: I make strong assumptions about the nature and structure of physical objects (also subatomic particles). Also about postulated unobservables. - ((s) In return, he avoids strong assumptions about the mathematics that deals with it).
>Theoretical entities, >Mathematical entities, >Mathematics, >Physics.
III 4
I will not screw my structural assumptions to a level below Platonism. ((s) That is, the assumption that the unobservable (e.g. subatomic particles) exist).
>Platonism, >Unobservables.

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