Correction: (max 500 charact.)
The complaint will not be published.
Glüer II 94ff
Quine: Ontology is only about physical objects and classes - action is not an object. DavidsonVsQuine: action event and reference object.
>
Actions , >
Events .
VsEvent ontology: various authors: Events are actually superfluous, because adverbial modifications can also be realized with more economical ontology. Montague, Clark, Parsons: "modifier-theory": no events, not restricted to "restrictive" adverbs, but more complex logical apparatus.
Jaegwon Kim: Identifying events not as individualized individuals, but with the help of characteristics. >
Individuation .
Glüer II 121ff
Davidson bases his entire philosophy on the ontology of particular events. Distinguishing between event token and description. >
Description/Davidson .
Quine: "No entity without identity"
The radical interpretation does not necessarily lead to uniform ontologies for all speakers.
Ontological categories: for Davidson: persons, material objects, events.
Ontology/Davidson: as a superordinate principle, is necessary whenever we recognize a grammatical category to which we must assign an infinite number of expressions - so we need events and objects: objects allow us to get adjectives under control - events: the same for some adverbs.
Glüer II 134
Ontology/Davidson/Glüer: Thesis: People, material objects, events. Question: could these ontological categories vary? - No, probably not in a way that different sorting makes sense.
Glüer II 137
Ontology/mental/physical/Davidson: is description-independent. - Intentionalist as well as physical discourse are based on the same event ontology.