Lexicon of Arguments

 

II 285
Necessity/QuineVsAristotle/QuineVsEssentialism: the essence not independent of our specification of the objects.
>Essentialism, >Essence, >Necessity/Quine.
II 292
Wiggins: An Operator "it is necessary that ..." creates opaque contexts: E.g. to be taken for Jekyll is not the same as to be taken for Hyde, although Jekyll = Hyde.
>Opacity, >Beliefs, >Speaker intention.
Also rigid designators in contexts with "it is possible that .." are not interchangeable (and probably not even in "necessary...").
>Operators, >Rigidity.
II 301
Necessary/Wiggins: analog to inner/outer negation: Tradition: to blurr the difference after the first method:
E.g.
"necessarily Socrates is a human"
and
"Socrates is necessarily a human".
Wiggins pro second method -> Definition satisfaction for sentences with "necessary": Wiggins pro existence as necessary feature -> Existence generalization.
II 303
Necessary/de dicto/Wiggins: simply wrong: E.g.

necessarily (x)(x = Cicero)> (x is a human).

de dicto: is it true? If so, we get the wrong thing:

necessarily (Ez)(x)(x = z > (x is a human).