Lexicon of Arguments

Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
[german]


Complaints - Corrections

Table
Concepts
Versus
Sc. Camps
Theses I
Theses II

Concept/Author*  

What is wrong?
Page
Other metadata
Translation
Excerpt or content
Other

Correction: Year / Place / Page
/ /

Correction:
(max 500 charact.)

Your username*
or User-ID

Email address*

The complaint
will not be published.

 
Stalnaker I 55f
Non-Existence/Empty Name/Meinong/QuineVsWyman/Quine/Stalnaker: (fictional Wyman)/Quine: a distinction between "there is" and "exists" (reserved for actuality). - QuineVs: existence is no predicate that introduces a distinctive property. Wyman creates the illusion of a match between Meinongians and their critics. Stalnaker: pro Quine: Existence: applies to everything, what can be quantified.
Stalnaker I 55
Pegasus/QuineVsWyman/Quine: Pegasus could have existed - the round square does not.
>Pegasus Example/Quine.
I 65
Wyman: Thesis: contradictions are meaningless - VsWyman: Stalnaker Quine, Lewis.
- - -
Quine III 258
About/non-existence/meaning/reference/Quine: similar error: to say that one talks with "Zerberus" about a thing Zerberus, and then the problem arises that one "talks about nothing".
Non-existence/Quine: this is not about "about". For example, what do you talk about when you say that there are no Bolivian warships?
III 259
Errors: to assume that our speaking only makes sense if there are the things we are talking about. (Confusion of meaning and object under discussion).
III 260
Non-existence/Possibility/meaning/significance/Quine: wrong solution: some authors think that a word for a completely impossible object is meaningless.
Analogue: just as a logically unrealizable sentence is a non-sentence, it is not false but meaningless. ((s) (here sic, but otherwise mostly called senseless.
QuineVs: 1. It is unnatural. 2. It is also impractical. Then we no longer have a test procedure for significance, just as quantifier logic has no decision-making procedure for universality and satisfiability.
Solution/Quine: it is sufficient that words have the task of designating something. This is sufficient to express non-existence. The words have a full meaning.
>Meaning/Quine.
III 281
Truth Value/Existence/Non-Existence/Ontology/Logic/Quine: what truth value do sentences such as "Zerberus barks" have? (See also >Unicorn example).
The answer "wrong" would be hasty.
III 282
Problem: for all sentences that would be wrong, there would be a negation that would then be true! Our derivation methods prove nothing in case the object does not exist. What would have to be proved is based on an unfulfilled condition.
Truth value gap/Quine: comes from the everyday language, in logic we have to fill it. And be it arbitrary. Each sentence should have a truth value (true or false).
>Truth Value/Quine, >Truth Value Gaps/Quine.
This was the reason for the convenient extension of the concept of the conditional in § 3,m which generally permitted a truth value for the entire conditional. We now need a similar extension for singular terms, which mean nothing.
But this cannot be achieved by an all-encompassing decision. However, this is possible for simple sentences from which we derive rules for compound sentences.
Def simple predicate: is a predicate if it does not explicitly take the form of quantification, negation, conjunction, alternation, etc. of shorter components.
If a simple predicate is applied to a singular term that does not denote anything, the sentence in question should be considered false. Then, for example, "Zerberus barks" is wrong, because it represents an application of the predicate "[1] barks" to "Zerberus".
I 429
Ideal objects: a case, with certain parallels to infinite quantities: the ideal objects of physics: e.g. mass points, smooth surfaces, isolated systems. Such objects would be contrary to the laws of theoretical physics. At the same time, however, the basic laws of mechanics are regularly formulated with reference to such ideal objects, usually with universal quantifying conditional sentences. "(x)(if x is a mass point, then...)"
Consequently, the absence of ideal objects does not falsify the mechanics! Sentences of this kind remain true in meaningless ways, since there are no counterexamples.

Found an error? Use our Complaint Form. Perhaps someone forgot to close a bracket? A page number is wrong?
Help us to improve our lexicon.
However, if you are of a different opinion, as regards the validity of the argument, post your own argument beside the contested one.
The correction will be sent to the contributor of the original entry to get his opinion about.