Lexicon of Arguments

Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
[german]


Complaints - Corrections

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Sc. Camps
Theses I
Theses II

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IV 107
Metaphysical: is the assumption that if there is a fact about the intentional state, then it is this fact that makes the attribution match the physical facts best.
IV 110
Metaphysical/Fodor/Lepore: not metaphysical: the finding that a suitable property is assumed as defining is not metaphysical.
Metaphysical: e.g. the assumption that rationality is constitutive of intentionality, e.g. that explanatory force and simplicity are constitutive of the nomological is transcendental, e.g. Davidson's assumption: the principle of chartiy is to be rooted in the epistemic situation of the interpreter.
LewisVsDavidson: intentional attribution must not be understood with reference to the epistemic situation of the radical interpretation.
Lewis instead: the principle of charity is part of our concept of the person.
>Principle of charity, >Attribution, >Belief ascription, >Mental states.

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