Lexicon of Arguments

 

I (b) 23
Propositional objects/Davidson: Thesis: attribution of propositional objects to other persons is analog to measuring.
E.g. objects of wishes, beliefs, intentions.
>Propositional attitudes, >Attribution, >Desire, >Beliefs, >Intentions, >Objects of belief, >Objects of thought.
They have no causal forces and therefore they cannot affect our mind and our brain, or us at all.
In what relation can we stand to them at all?
These are the two tools that allow a finite vocabulary to cover infinite regions. Objects allow us to get adjectives under control. Events do the same for some adverbs. And when measuring, this task is fulfilled by the numbers.
Now we can separate the semantic need for objects by which one can specify the content of propositions from the idea that there must be any objects at all with which someone who has a propositional attitude is in psychic contact.
E.g.: weights of different objects: some weigh the same, some weigh twice as much, some nothing. The introduction of a scale does not change this.
The only objects we need are the numbers and the things that have weight. With the statement: in Karat, the weight of the diamond is 109, we do not specify weights in the sense of objects.
According to this, there is no alternative for the conceptions of doctrines as relational sentences.
This "relativism", however, contains nothing that could show that the measured properties are not "real".
I (b) 26
Measuring/Davidson: a scale does not alter the fact of weight or ratios - numbers are needed but do not belong to the object - ontology: weight is nothing objectual - analogy to measurement: attribution of intentional states - numbers: here only the proportions have to be preserved - however: if there is no contradiction between 0° Celsius and 32° Fahrenheit, this does not show that the measured properties are not "real".