I 73
Meaning in Mentalese determines meaning in public language, but not vice versa (on the content of thoughts).
Fodor: we must see intentional properties of mental states as inherited from the semantic properties of the mental representations, which are implied in their tokening.
Neural state: also exists if false. - There is no object, since with truth value.
Schiffer: is still no system, not yet like a language.
Harman: thesis: inner representations have sentence-like structure.
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Mental representation.
Lewis: language of the brain of synaptic connections and neuronal fires -> SLT (strong thesis of a language of thought).
Other thesis: semantic properties are inherited from intentional properties. - (VsStrong thesis of a language of thought).
Strong thesis of a language of thought Vs: short/(s): mental representation determines intentionality. Tthis can be explained without public content.
SchifferVs: that cannot be fulfilled.
I 76
Mentalese/relation theory/Schiffer: which relation of sentences is there in Mentalese to sentences in English?
>
Relation theory.
Problem: the mental sentence "s" cannot be specified by meaning in English (that would be circular).
Also Vs core thesis of the strong thesis of a language of thought (semantic properties of the public language are inherited from intentional properties of mental states).
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Mental states.
I 282
Mentalese/Schiffer: meaning is here not a question of convention and intention - unlike public language.
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Convention, >
Intention, >
Everyday language.
Solution/some authors: conceptual role (c.r.) in Mentalese.
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Conceptual role.
Public language: here sentences have a conceptual role only if they are also thought, not only spoken.
Problem: we need a non-semantic relation between mental representation and public sentences. - Fortunately the inner code needs not to be mentioned here.
E.g. "state with the same content".
Problem: the speaker could believe a sentence only under additional assumptions. - This only with reference to content. - That does not work in a strong thesis of a language of thought.
Conclusion: a neural sentence cannot be accepted without reference to the content as an object of belief.
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Objects of belief, >
Content.
I 78
Mentalese/Schiffer: Relation theory requires complex properties, F which has everything; E.g.
"flounders snore".
Problem: we must not presuppose anything about the intentional properties of mental states or meaning in public language.
I 79
Mentalese/Relation theory/belief/Fodor/Schiffer: for the attribution of truth values from situations to sentences: for this purpose, properties are used at the end of the causal chain.
>
Relation theory.
Problem: quantification via properties as semantic values ultimately goes via propositions.
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Propositions, >
Quantification.
Solution: SLT (strong thesis of a language of thought) can use propositions together with conceptual roles for the individuation of content. - Truth values by M-function to possible situations - additional physical condition C.
Problem: this approach needs the theory of representation - (in which mental representation is only a special case).
Truth conditions: formula: a is the truth condition for s in x' inner code if under optimal conditions x s believes if and only if a exists. - So we can identify a pattern of neuronal firing with the display of a fly for a frog.
Problem: only under optimal conditions.
SchifferVsFodor: then everyone is omniscient and infallible.
I 87
Mentalese/Charity Principle/Schiffer: the charity principle is not for mentalism - this would have to be explained in terms of propositions.
I 83-90
Relation theory/Mentalese/Schiffer: Problem: competing attribution functions for truth conditions ("M functions") - wrong solution: "larger survival value" does not exclude wrong attribution functions - e.g. weight/mass.
I 189
SLT/strong thesis of a language of thought/Mentalese/Schiffer: thesis
1. the brain is a computer, we are information-processing systems with an inner neural code.
Schiffer: I can agree with that.
2. there is a computational relation R for every belief that one can have, so that one has this belief iff one has R for this formula.
Schiffer: that works, but only with substitutional quantification.
E.g. "Nodnol si yggof": Mentalese for London is foggy.
Then the sentence means that, but is not compositional.
N.B.: then the content of belief cannot be reduced. - (SchifferVsReductionism) - ((s) Mental content is irreducible (Schiffer pro Brentano).
E.g. knowledge-how cannot be analyzed in other terms - there is no fact that makes that something is this faith - + +
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Knowing-how, >
Nonfactualism.
