Lexicon of Arguments

 

I 206
Mentalese/belief/Field/Peacocke: Field Thesis: systems that are sufficiently complex for belief terms, have systems of internal representations in which the sentence-analogues have significant grammatical structure.
>Complexity, >Structure, >Systems, >Beliefs, >Thoughts,
>Propositional Attitudes, >Thinking, >Representation, >Internal States, >Internal Objects, >Belief Objects, >Thought Objects,
cf. >Artificial Intelligence.
I 209
Mentalese/Peacocke: a model that works without the assumption of a language of thought would have to explain two things:
1. How can one ascribe propositional content, without referring to syntactic structures? - That means, relatively complex content must be attributed to syntactically unstructured (psychic) states.
>Propositional content, >Content.
2. It must be shown, how these states interact with perception and behavior.
>Perception, >Behavior.
I 215
A simple model (relation instead of language) does not seem to require the instrumentalist conception of a rational actor. - On the contrary, if someone meets the relational model, a realism regarding mechanisms of rational belief-desire psychology would be justified.
>Realism, >Rationality.