Lexicon of Arguments

 

Rorty I 269 ff
Rorty: Fodor's image of the internal representations has nothing to do with our mirror of nature that we have accepted. What is crucial, is that with regard to Fodor's "Language of thought" the skeptical question of "how exactly do the internal representations represent the reality" cannot be asked! There is no gap.
>Representations, >Reference, >World/Thinking.
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Newen/Schrenk I 132
Mentalese/language of thought/thought language/Fodor/Newen/Schrenk: thesis: thinking takes place with mental representations, e.g. fuel gauge, causal connection. >Thinking.
Mentalese: mentaleses is as rich as natural language, but purely internal and symbolic; it is a purely syntactic symbol manipulation and exists only in connection with propositional attitudes.
>Propositional attitudes.
VsFodor: a) regress.
I 133
b) The supporters of the thesis of the prevalence of thought cannot explain the normativity of thinking with the help of social institutions such as the language. c) There are also beliefs without representation: e.g. chess computers: "brute force" then: "I should take the queen out of the game early".
Cf. >Chess/Artificial intelligence.