I 47
SearleVsMaterialism: wrong question: how particles without intelligence produce intelligence (higher status, simple dynamic organization).
>
Levels(Order), >
Description level.
I 18 ff
"Eliminative materialism": eliminative materialism is the idea that there is no such thing as "desires", "hopes", "fears", etc.. (Feyerabend 1963, Rorty 1965).
I 27
Together with the Cartesian tradition, we have inherited a vocabulary, and with it certain categories. The vocabulary is not harmless, because it implicitly contains various theoretical assertions whose falsity is almost certain: apparent opposites: physical/spiritual, body/mind. Materialism/mentalism, matter/soul.
It contains the assumption that, strictly speaking, one and the same phenomenon cannot satisfy both limbs of the pair of opposites.
Therefore, we should believe that something spiritual cannot be physical.
I 40
SearleVsMonism, SearleVsMaterialism: Monism and materialism are equally missed. The real mistake was to start counting at all! >
Monism, >
dualism, >
Cartesianism.
What exactly does "materialism" mean? One might perhaps think that it consists in the view that the microstructure of the world is entirely composed of material particles. The difficulty, however, lies in the fact that this conception is compatible with almost every philosophy of mind. Today, however, no one believes in the existence of immortal spiritual substances.
I 53
Either identity-theoretical materialism ignores the spirit, or it does not ignore it; if it ignores it, it is false; if it does not ignore it, it is not materialism.
I 62
Def "elimininative materialism": Stich and Churchland are of the opinion that there are no states of mind at all.
>
Churchland, Patricia, >
Churchland, Paul.
Materialism adopts the worst assumption of dualism.
I 72
The deepest reason for this fear of consciousness is that consciousness probably does not have a solution to the characteristics of subjectivity.
>
Subjectivity.
I 112
The question of how to "naturalize" consciousness does not arise at all; it is already completely natural!
>
Consciousness, cf. >
Identity theory.
. Paul Feyerabend (1963). Materialism and the mind-body problem. In: Review of Metaphysics 17 (1):49-67
2. Richard Rorty !1965). Mind-body identity, privacy, and categories. In: Review of Metaphysics 19 (1):24-54
