Lexicon of Arguments

Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
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Theses I
Theses II

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VI 81
Dictionary/Lexicon/Quine: does not describe objects, but use of words - is not about synonymy of terms - is not about cognitive equivalence of sentences.
- - -
VII (c) 49
Lexicon/Quine: shows couples of synonymous sequences (no monopoly on meaning).
- - -
II 65
Lexicon: the lexicographer will often use a so-called "meaning distinction": he will call several partial synonyms, some of which fit into subcontexts, others into others. The contexts must then be kept apart with reference to the topic.
II 99
Lexicon: the definition of words in the lexicon is nothing more than a recursive definition of sentence meanings.
Russell's examination of incomplete symbols continues and extends to classes.
II 139
Lexicon of Predicates: You can define an identity in any theory, even in one without classes and elements.
This is the method of exhaustion of the Lexicon of Predicates.
Trivial example: Suppose we have only two undefined single-digit predicates. F and G as well as a two-digit predicate H and no constant singular terms or functors, only quantifiers and truth functions. Then we can define "x = y" as

Fx bik Fy.Gx bik GY.(z)(Hxz bik Hyz.Hzx bik Hzy)

which ensures substitutivity in atomic contexts. Now the entire logic of identity can be derived. The method can be applied to any finite lexicon of undefined predicates and it defines real identity or an afterimage indistinguishable from it every time. Undistinguishable in terms of the corresponding theory.
>Predicates/Quine.
II 139/140
How will it work if our approach to explain identity by exhaustion of the predicates is generalized? Let us assume a rich lexicon of predicates. Certain predicates will be desired in terms of properties, in particular "has". Others will be superfluous (e.g. property "be pink" or property "divisible by four"). Ryle branded such predications as category confusion. Russell and Carnap the same.
QuineVsRyle/QuineVsCarnap/QuineVsRussell: for years I have represented a minority of philosophers who prefer the opposite direction: we can simplify grammar and logic by minimizing our grammatical categories and maximizing their scope instead.
II 141/142
Are all cases actually due to "has"? If so, the exhaustion of our encyclopedia would be done in no time at all, which would result in all properties being identical if exactly the same things "have" them. In this case, properties are extensional.
We might as well read this "has" as being-contained and call properties classes. But they are classes as multiplicities, not as a unit. Because we declare it "ungrammatical" to present them as elements of other classes. They occur only through their values.
However, if there are desired contexts of property variables that are not due to "has", it should be possible to create a list and thus individualize properties.
>Properties/Quine.

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