Lexicon of Arguments

Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
[german]


Complaints - Corrections

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Theses I
Theses II

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I 54
Minimalism/logic/conditional/Wright, Cripsin: we cannot ask for more than for a statement to obviously appear as a conditional.
Wright: there are no "deeper" notions of a "real" conditional tense" or "deeper" notion of an assertoric content.
>Content, >Assertion, >Assertibility.
For our purposes, surface features suffice, even though it were certainly be possible to fix the corresponding features.
 ((s) In particular, no metaphysical assumptions about a "true-making realm" are necessary.)
>Truthmakers.
Expression theory/Wright: must make a distinction between genuine and merely apparent conditionals:
e.g. genuine conditional: If it rains tomorrow, the visit is canceled
e.g. apparent conditional: If you behave badly, the visit is canceled.
Cf. >Truth evaluability.

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