I 225f
SearleVsCognition: the brain is like a computer: that is not the question but is the mind like a program? No, it is not. But simulation is! The mind has an intrinsical mental content, therefore there is no program.
A program is syntactically or formally defined; the mind has intrinsically spiritual content. It follows immediately from this that the program itself cannot constitute the mind. The formal syntax of the program does not guarantee the existence of spiritual content by itself. (>
Chinese room), >
Mental state/Searle.
I 226
Def Strong artificial intelligence/Searle: the mind is like a program. >
Strong Artificial Intelligence.
Def Weak artificial intelligence: brain processes can be simulated with computers.
>
Artificial Intelligence.
Def Cognitivism: the brain is like a computer.
>
Computation, >
Information processing/Psychology.
I 227
Def Strong Artificial Intelligence (AI): having a mind means having a program, and more is not on the mind.
Def Weak AI: brain processes can be simulated using a computer.
Def Cognitivism: cognitivism is the view that the brain is a digital computer.
I 228
What about semantics? After all, programs are purely syntactic.
Answer of the AI: the development of proof theory has shown that semantic relations can be reflected completely by the syntactic relations that exist between the propositions. And this is exactly what a computer does: it implements evidence theory!
The content of syntactic objects, if any, is irrelevant to how they are processed.
>
Semantics, >
Syntax, >
Content, >
Proof theory.
I 229
Note in particular Turing's comparison of conscious program implementation by the human computer and unconscious program implementation by the brain or by a mechanical computer.
Furthermore, note the idea that we might discover programs that we have put into our mechanical computers.
(1) It is often suggested that some dualism is the only alternative to the view that the brain is a digital computer.
(2) It is also assumed that the question of whether brain processes are computational is simply an empirical question.
It is as much to be decided by investigation as the question of whether the heart is a pump or not.
I 230
The question of whether the brain is actually a computer is, in her opinion, just as little a philosophical question as the question of chemical processes.
Searle: for me, this is a mystery: what kind of fact that concerns the brain could make it a computer?
It is assumed that somehow somebody must have done the basic philosophical work of linking mathematics with electrical engineering. But as far as I can see, this is not the case.
There is little theoretical agreement on absolutely fundamental questions: what exactly is a digital computer? >
Computer model, >
computation.
