Cresswell I 117
Descriptions/Russell: are never names - Other authors VsRussell: Descriptions are names, but not of normal objects but of intensional objects (various objects in different worlds). - CresswellVs intentional objects.
>
Objects of thought, >
Objects of belief, >
Mental objects.
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Geach I 61
Description/Russell is never a name: E.g. The Duke of Cambridge is also a pub, but the Duke does not sell beer.
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Newen I 90
Theory of Descriptions/Russell: E.g. 1. There is at least one author of "Waverley" (existence assertion) - 2. There is at most one author of "Waverley" (uniqueness assertion)
- 3. Whoever wrote "Waverley", was a Scott (statement content) - E.g. The current King of France/empty names: At least one king of France is bald - 2. At most one - 3. whoever ... is bald - E.g. identity: at least one denounced Catiline - 2. At most one ... - 1* at least one wrote "De Oratore" - 2* at most one ... - 3. Whoever denounced Catiline, wrote ... - E.g. negative existence sentences "It is not the case that 1. At least one .. - 2. At most one ... - RussellVsFrege: thus one avoids to accept Fregean sense as an abstract entity.
Truth-value gaps/RussellVsFrege: they too are thus avoided.
I 92
N.B.: sentences that seemed to be about a subject, are now about general propositions about the world.
>
Fregean sense, >
Truth value gap.
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Russell I VIII
E.g. Waverley - all true sentences have the same meaning - e.g. "Author of Waverley." Is no description of Scott - Description (labeling) is not the same as assertion - this does not refer to an object. - StrawsonVs - A sentence with "Waverley" says nothing about Scott, because it does not contain Scott.
I 46
Descriptions/Russell: are always in the singular E.g. "father of" but not "son of" (not clear - always presuppoes quotes without "the": "jx": "x is φ" - instead of (ix)(jx) in short "R'y": the R of y, "the father of y" - characterizing function, not propositional function all mathematical functions are distinctive features.
>
Function/Russell.
I 96
Description/Principia Mathematica
(1)/Russell: "The author of Waverley" means nothing - we cannot
define (ix)(jx) only its use - (>
?concept=Definitions">definition,
definability).
1. Whitehead, A.N. and Russel, B. (1910). Principia Mathematica. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
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Flor III 122
Descriptions/Russell/Flor: are not names - reason: otherwise it would result in a mere triviality: "a = a" or something wrong. E.g. "The Snow man does not exist" is something different than to say, "Paul does not exist" - Descriptions: incomplete symbols - ((s) If description were names, they could not fail.)
>
Incomplete symbol, >
Names.