Lexicon of Arguments

 

I 3
Explanation/Description/Physics/Cartwright: in modern physics the phenomenological laws are considered as being descriptive, the fundamental laws as being explanatory.
Problem: the explanatory power comes at the cost of the adequacy of description
Explanatory power (of laws) The semblance of truth comes from a false explanation model: wrong connection of laws with reality.
I 4
Cartwright instead:
Def "Simulacrum" View/Cartwright: of explanation: Thesis: the way from theory to reality is this:
theory > model > phenomenological law

Phenomenological Laws/Cartwright: are true of the objects of reality (or can be).
Fundamental Laws/Cartwright: are only true of the objects in the model. >Fundamental laws/Cartwright.
Explanation/Cartwright: is not a guide to the truth.
I 57
Description/Laws of Nature/LoN/Physical Laws/Cartwright: E.g. the gravitation law does not describe the behavior of the objects, because electrical forces also play a role - (Coulomb's law) - no charged body behaves according to the gravitation law.
And every massive body is a counter-E.g. to Coulomb's law.
Solution: "... if no other forces..." - without ceteris paribus. >ceteris paribus.
I 131
Description/Physics/Cartwright: false: that we have to depart from existence assumptions to come to a description according to which we can set up the equations.
Correct: the theory has only few principles to move from descriptions to equations - these principles certainly require structured information. - And the "descriptions" on the right side have to satisfy many mathematical requirements. >Equations, >Principles.
The best descriptions are those that best match the equations.