Lexicon of Arguments

 Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
[german]


Complaints - Corrections

Table
Concepts
Versus
Sc. Camps
Theses I
Theses II

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I 208f
Introspection/RyleVsIntrospection/Ryle: introspection cannot be what the tradition expects of it as its object is a myth.

Consciousness: what I can find out about me is of the same nature as what I can find out about others - the small differences just do not favor self-knowledge (RyleVsNagel).
>Self-knowledge, >Authority of the First Person, >Priviledged access, >Incorrigibility, >Self-consciousness, >Consciousness.
I 216
RyleVsTradition: we do not encounter any symptoms inside - such events do not exist.
I 221 f
Introspection/RyleVsIntrospection/Ryle: there are no ghostly objects but suppose there were, then there is a regress: one would perceive then at the same time, that one perceives them.
>Regress.
Bad solution: then one would have to admit that there are imperceptible inner objects - a knowledge about it could not be based on introspection.
>Mental objects, >Objects of thought, >Objects of belief, >Mentalism.

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